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1 
Abstract 
Lebanese women cannot confer their citizenship to their children incase they marry a non-
Lebanese man, nor can the man become a naturalized citizen through his Lebanese spouse. The 
purpose of this study is to describe the reasons to the policy of dependent citizenship in the 
Lebanese case, as well as its objectives. Lebanese women’s dependent citizenship in conjunction 
with the 15 different confessional Personal Status Codes, create a female citizen who needs to 
depend on male relatives to access some rights, which becomes even more problematic if the 
husband is foreign. Children to non-Lebanese fathers have reduced access to schooling, work and 
healthcare.  
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3 
Introduction 
Lebanese women cannot confer their nationality to their children if the father is a foreigner with 
some rare and specific exceptions. This is a feature that Lebanon shares with many other Arab 
countries, which seems to be a contradiction to Lebanon’s reputation as the liberal country of the 
Arab Middle East. 
I first came across this issue while working with an international human rights organization in 
Lebanon. Children to Lebanese mothers and foreign fathers have restricted access to healthcare, 
education and work, as well as to housing. Often they become “illegal residents” while still being 
minors because their residency permit haven’t been renewed in due time, if it ever has existed in 
the first place. In the poorer sections of society this seems to bring families who already are in 
difficulties deeper into marginalization, and families who are better off financially often choose to 
live elsewhere.  
This question has steadily gained more importance over the last years in Lebanon. Feminist 
groups frame it as a question of women’s civil and political rights. Are women really full citizens 
if their offspring is not entitled to any of their mothers’ rights, they ask? The Nationality Law in 
conjunction with the Personal Status Laws suggests otherwise, as they put Lebanese women in a 
very specific, dependent position as citizens.  
 
Why then apply such a rule?  
Aim of  th is  s tudy 
The aim of this study is to discuss the reasons for Lebanon to introduce and maintain the policy 
of dependent citizenship for women. Is it a question of religion, politics, culture or a 
reinforcement of patriarchy? Or is the main reason political, to keep certain groups within the 
Lebanese society outside of political power?  
In my intention to discuss the questions asked above, I will answer the questions below: 
- What is the reasoning behind dependent citizenship for women in Lebanon? 
- Which objectives have been driving the actors involved in introducing and maintaining 
dependent citizenship for Lebanese women? Are they political, religious, cultural or 
patriarchal? 
In order to answer this questions, I will consult Lebanon’s modern history to see how women’s 
citizenship has changed, from when Lebanon still constituted a part of an Ottoman province, to 
the establishment of the French mandate, and now, post-independence. The chronological 
description of Lebanese citizenship will be an aim in itself.  
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Theore t i c al  f ramework 
Citizenship and Nationality 
In the literature, citizenship is usually defined as the legal relationship between a citizen and the 
state, regulating his political rights and social benefits. Nationality is often treated as a synonym to 
citizenship, but most cultures regard nationality to be inherited through blood. Mary Ann 
Tétreault points out that nation and nationality has almost religious overtones, which citizenship 
doesn’t.1 
Uri Davis notes that the Universal Declaration of Human Rights created a difference between 
nationality and citizenship;  
Article 15; Everyone has the right to a nationality. No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his 
nationality.  
Nationality is thus a human right, but citizenship and the rights they entail, varies. Davis gives the 
example of British Commonwealth inhabitants, all of whom are British nationals but with 
different citizenship status – not all have the right to abode in the United Kingdom.2 
Citizenship Rights 
Rania Maktabi describes the rights inherent in citizenship: “Membership in a state is channeled 
through one authoritative agent, the state’s governing regime, and has all-encompassing effects 
on a person. Citizenship accords the citizen with access to a range of resources at the state’s 
disposal, depending on the level of modernization as reflected in political, social and economic 
institutions: Civil resources (legal protection and access to the courts of law); social resources 
(welfare, education and health services); political resources (voting, political representation); and 
economic resources (use of the state’s land and water, work permits, jobs in the state 
administration, legal inheritance, right to purchase property). The right of permanent abode in 
the territories of the state is also an important ingredient in citizenship rights.3  
 
Uri Davis describes citizenship as a certificate that represents equal legal access for a citizen to 
civil, political and social institutions in a democratic state – in addition to the right to abode in the 
country. In the Lebanese context, he differentiates between citizenship as muwatana and jinsiyya, 
which he translates as “democratic citizenship” and “passport citizenship”. I would however 
translate muwatana and jinsiyya to citizenship and nationality respectively, from the Arabic.4 Davis 
rejects the term nationality, in its meaning of an imagined community or kinship. I will, however, 
use the term nationality.  
                                                
1 Tétreault, Mary Ann, ‘Gender, Citizenship and State in the Middle East’, in Butenschon, Nils A. (eds.), Citizenship 
and the State in the Middle East, p. 70. 
2 Davis, Uri, Citizenship and the State: A Comparative Study of Citizenship Legislation in Israel, Jordan, Palestine, Syria and 
Lebanon, p. 6. 
3 Maktabi, Rania, ‘State Formation and Citizenship in Lebanon: The Politics of Membership and Exclusion in a 
Sectarian State’, in Butenschon, Nils A. (eds.), Citizenship and the State in the Middle East, p. 152. 
4 Cowan, J.M., The Hans Wehr Dictionary of Modern Written Arabic, 4th edition, Spoken Languages Services (1994), p. 
167 [Jnsiyya], nationality, citizenship and p. 1265, the closest available term [muWaaTin], meaning citizen, fellow.  
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Nils A. Butenschon describes citizenship as “raison d’etat, the state idea” and states further that 
the authority to define citizenship affects the entire state.5 The authority to define citizenship 
defines the state, since citizenship not only regulates, but creates the legal status of the particular 
individual.6 
The Citizenship Idea 
The idea of citizenship traces back to the birth of the modern nation state after the peace of 
Westphalia in 1648, as well as to modern contractivism and the social contract (Thomas Hobbes, 
Jean-Jaques Rousseau and John Locke), in which people agree to relinquish from some of the 
freedoms of the state of nature by subjecting themselves to the laws of a political authority and 
gain civil rights, thus indirectly creating civil society. The power of the political authority stems 
from the general will of the people (Rousseau) since the social contract can be renegotiated 
through the right of rebellion (John Locke).  
As noted by Butenschon, citizenship can be described as the embodiment of the state idea. By 
awarding citizenship to some and not to others, the state defines itself – what it is and what it is 
not. The law distinguish between citizens and foreigners, and by briefly exploring some of the 
history of contractarianism we can conclude another thing - there are often distinctions between 
men and women in citizenship laws. Women have not been the same citizens as men.  
Citizenship and Gender Hierarchy 
In her well-known work “The Sexual Contract”, Caroline Pateman showed that the idea of 
universal political right and citizenship proclaimed by the contractarians, implied a sexual 
hierarchy that excluded women from political power, despite the egalitarian language of the 
original contract. Pateman argues that the political order of the original contract that gained 
ground during the enlightenment implied a consolidation of modern patriarchy. 
Contract theory was a revolutionary change in how political authority was viewed. Instead of the 
political authority of the ancient law, which stems from the sons’ subjection to their father (padria 
potestas) which Pateman terms Classic Patriarchalism, the original contract formed a political 
community from a civil fraternity, a brotherhood of equals, without the requirement of blood 
descent. The civil fraternity created a universal, albeit hierarchical citizenship,7 in which men were 
equals merely on account of being men. This created an obvious alien to the political community 
– women. Initially, some were worried that the original contract would take away men’s authority 
over women and create a social revolution, but for example John Locke provided contract 
theorists with arguments to defend the current power relation, saying that women’s subjection to 
men was ‘natural’.8 Locke furthermore argued for the separation of the familial from the political, 
requiring that women were to remain in the former, thus separating women from the political 
                                                
5 Butenschon, Nils A., ‘State, Power, and Citizenship in the Middle East’ in Butenschon, Nils A. (eds.), Citizenship and 
the State in the Middle East, p. 6. 
6 Ibid. p. 11. 
7 Pateman, Carole, ‘The Sexual Contract’, p. 81. 
8 Ibid. p. 91. 
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right as well as from the public sphere in general.9 The private sphere was created through 
marriage and the marriage contract, in which the women entered as an independent party – 
although women were not considered to be fit to partake in the original contract. The married 
couple was viewed as one person before the law. 
The original contract separated the private and the public sphere to a greater extent than before. 
In both spheres women are subject to men and patriarchal right, according to Pateman. Indeed, 
“Civil society (as a whole) is patriarchal.”10 Citizenship, according to the early contract theorists, 
was thus universal – for men. The original contract also implied that men, through marriage and 
the marriage contract, exercised control over women’s reproductive abilities – which Pateman 
simply terms ‘sex right’ - and in theory, that each man were to have a woman (‘for each brother a 
woman’).11  
Citizenship and Kinship 
Citizenship presupposes a state in which one can be citizen. In old states, since long familiar with 
the idea of the Nation-state, the relation between the citizen and the state is direct. In younger 
states, citizenship usually competes with another type of membership; kinship. Kin, as in family 
and tribe, is still very important in many Middle Eastern countries. Blood is a central theme for 
kin, being the liquid of identity as Suad Joseph put it.12 Most tribes and families are patrilines, i.e. 
it is the descent of the father that counts  (patrilineality). Kinship, as well as citizenship, is a way 
to organize politically and socially. In patrilineal kinship, authority usually rests with the patriarch, 
thus reminding of the padria potestas of Pateman’s term ‘classical patriarchy’. In patrineal kinships, 
authority is associated with masculinity and age.  
Suad Joseph argues that, given the weakness of the Lebanese state, Lebanese citizens experience 
kin as their basis of security. Indeed, “Kinship is a site of cultural unity in a society that is 
politically fragmented and has often seen itself as culturally fragmented.”13 
In Lebanon, patriarchal kin is a central structure that ties the public and private spheres together. 
Political leaders mobilize their kin for support in patron-client relationships, who expects favors 
or money in return (‘wasta’ - brokerage), and elites distribute resources based on real or idiomatic 
kinship to males and elders, who exercise control over women and children.14  
 
                                                
9 Ibid. 21 and 90.  
10 Ibid. 113. 
11 Ibid. 110. 
12 Joseph, Suad, ‘Descent of the Nation: Kinship and Citizenship in Lebanon’, 3:3 Citizenship Studies (1999), p. 301. 
13 Ibid. 298. 
14 Joseph, Suad, ‘The Public/Private: The Imagined Boundary in the Imagined Nation/State/Community: The 
Lebanese Case’, No. 57 Feminist Review (1997), p. 79. 
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Patriarchy and Paternalism 
Since this essay tries to explain the structural discrimination towards women inherent in the 
Lebanese citizenship laws, firmly putting women in a determined position in society, I feel a need 
to bring patriarchy and paternalism into the discussion.  
  
In ‘The creation of Patriarchy’, Gerda Lerner argued that women have been subjected to a certain 
form of patriarchy for almost four thousand years, which she calls paternalistic dominance.15 She 
describes it as an un-written contract, in terms similar to those of Carole Pateman, (who didn’t 
agree with Lerner on this point, and argued that the relationship between men and women were 
always changing and the un-written contract was always renegotiable). “The basis of paternalism 
is an un-written contract for exchange: economic support and protection given by the male for 
subordination in all matters, sexual service, and un-paid domestic service given by the female.”16 
She derives the pattern of the paternalistic behavior from family relations under patriarchy, in 
which the father “had absolute power over all the members in the household”, in other words 
the padria potestas. But whereas the sons finally break loose from the power of father when they 
become heads of households themselves, the subordination of women as wives and daughters is 
life-long.17  
Although Lerner argues that patriarchy has maintained much of its paternalistic character for the 
last thousand years or so, she regards patriarchy as a historical development, which has been 
consolidated in laws and religious statutes. Lerner defined patriarchy with the following words:  
“[Patriarchy] is the manifestation and institutionalization of male dominance over women and children 
in the family and the extension of male dominance over women in society in general.”18 
 
Sylvia Walby gives the following definition of patriarchy: “[Patriarchy is] a system of social 
structures and practices, in which men dominate, oppress and exploit women.”19 Walby 
differentiates between private and public patriarchy, the first of which takes place in the 
household (although Walby recognizes that the household also is a public structure, but a less 
important one) and the second in the public workplaces and the state. The patriarchal strategies 
and the mode of expropriation differ according to type of patriarchy: “In private patriarchy the 
expropriation of women’s labor takes place primarily by individual patriarchs within the 
household, while in the public form it is a more collective appropriation. In private patriarchy the 
principle patriarchal strategy is exclusionary; in the public it is segregationist and subordinating.”20  
 
                                                
15 Lerner, Gerda, The Creation of Patriarchy, p. 217.  
16 Ibid. 218.  
17 Ibid. 240.  
18 Ibid. 239. 
19 Walby, Sylvia, Theorizing Patriarchy, p. 20. 
20 Ibid. 24.  
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Method 
In order to answer the questions above, I have analyzed the Lebanese version of dependent 
citizenship from a number different angles: The legal stipulations that constitutes the basis of 
dependent citizenship, the religious and ethic stipulations that lies underneath them and the 
political realities when the law of nationality, the constitution and the Personal Status Codes were 
promulgated. I have synthesized theory on citizenship with patriarchy and kinship. I discussed 
definitions on nationality/citizenship, as well as patriarchalism/paternity, but have used them as 
synonyms.  
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Part One: Citizenship in Lebanon during the 
Ottoman Empire 
Histor ical  background –  The Firs t  Worl d  War in Lebanon 
World War I had devastating effects on Lebanon, which still was a part of an Ottoman province. 
Draught and miss-growth pushed Mount Lebanon and the surrounding areas into a hunger crisis 
that lasted throughout the war. Mount Lebanon, with its predominantly Christian population, 
was hit hardest by the great famine, and wished for support from France.21 Both Ottomans and 
the Allies, however, were equally known to use the ‘famine weapon’ against the Lebanese. The 
Allies had shut down all the ports, including the primary supply route to Lebanon, which 
depended heavily on imports. The British had hoped that famine would spark an Arab revolt 
against the Ottoman Empire, making it crumble from within. Discontent with the Ottomans did 
increase with the difficult conditions during the war, as did Arab Nationalism.  
Many Syrians started to collaborate with the army of Sharif Husayn, led by his son, Prince Faysal 
(Faysal bin Al-Hussain bin Ali Al-Hashemi 1883 – 1933).22 The Allies encouraged the Arabs to 
rise against the Ottoman Turks who sided with the Germans, and in 1916 Prince Faysal and the 
Hashemite family of Mecca did. This became known as the Arab revolt. The Allies and the Arab 
troops entered Damascus and Beirut in October 1918, and an armistice was signed with the 
Ottomans by the end of the same month. By November, the war had ended. The military 
government proclaimed liberation and independence, and the support for a Syrian-Arab 
Kingdom ruled by the Hashemite Prince Faysal was widespread among Muslims in Lebanon and 
Syria23 while Christian Lebanese wanted a separate state.  
 
At the same time, socially and politically active women would reject yet another government 
where political power was based on paternalism – they petitioned the Syrian Congress to permit 
women’s suffrage. “In essence, women favored universal democracy over both fraternal 
republicanism and the male hierarchy of paternalism.”24 
By then, however, the European peacemakers of the League of Nations had changed their minds 
and French rule was unilaterally imposed on the territory, which was divided into two countries, 
Syria and Lebanon, with their good will. The intention of the mandate was to prepare the people 
for self-determination along the lines of Woodrow Wilson.  
                                                
21 Thompson, Elizabeth, Colonial Citizens: Republican Rights, Paternal Privilege, and Gender in French Syria and Lebanon, p. 2. 
22 Ibid. 23.  
23 The Muslims were not unanimously supporting Prince Faysal. Some opposed the secularism of Prince Faysal’s 
Hashemite Kingdom and wanted a Sunni Muslim Patriarch, others rejected his Arab (he was born in Mecca) ancestry 
in favour of the local Syrian notables, and others wanted to unite with what was left of Anatolia (mainly the 
population in the north of Syria). 
24 Ibid. 41. 
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Faysal’s army revolted against the French, but was defeated in the famous battle of Khan 
Maysalun on July 24 1920.25 The French were better received in Lebanon, where many greeted 
them as liberators.  
 
Citizenship during  the  Ot toman Empire  
In 1918, European powers started dividing the Ottoman Empire, which marked the culmination 
of a period of westernization and reforms within the Ottoman Empire that had taken place 
during the nineteenth century. Mahmud II (1807 – 1839) had initiated economic, social and 
religious reforms, which centralized the state and reformed the ownership of land, reducing the 
power of the religious clerks (The Ulema’). The Tanzimat reforms challenged the notion of 
Muslim supremacy.26 In 1840 new law codes regarding administration and economy were 
introduced, largely based on Western law codes, with law courts of western type. In 1870 the 
Mejelle, the civil law, was issued, considered to be the first attempt to codify the Islamic Shariah. 
This was replaced by the secular Family Law of 1917.  
 
The Family Law of 1917 did not only impose on a legal area that originally was the domain of the 
autonomous religious sects27, but also equalized the political status of the different religious 
communities, when the Muslim sect previously had enjoyed a privilege in that matter. The law 
also improved Muslim women’s rights in key areas such as marriage, divorce and inheritance.  
The Ottoman Citizenship Law (Tabiyet-I Osmaniye Kanunnamesi (the TOK))28 was issued on 19 
January 1869, inspired by the French citizenship law of 1851, and regulated many of the 
problems of modern citizenship, such as naturalization (Articles 3 and 4), surrender of citizenship 
(Article 5) and, most important, the effect of marriage on women’s citizenship (Article 7), which 
stated the following: 
Article 7. The woman who, while an Ottoman subject, marries a foreigner may return to her original 
nationality if, within three years following the date of her husband’s death, she petitions for it. […]  
 
The Citizenship Law of 1869 thus provided for dependent citizenship for women, but so did 
virtually all the Western countries until a good part into the 20th century, mostly as a protective 
political measure against immigration. For comparison, I can mention that American women 
received independent citizenship in 1922, with the ‘Married Women’s Independent Citizenship 
Act’.29 
The Citizenship Law also leveled much of the premier status previously enjoyed by Muslim 
citizens. Article 27 of the 1876 Constitution further stated:  
                                                
25 Ibid. 39.  
26 Lapidus, Ira M., A History of Islamic Societies, p. 495.  
27 Thompson says that the Patriarchs of all three creeds objected that it “illegally undercut their authority”, p. 150. 
28 Flournoy, Richard W., A collection of nationality laws of Various Countries as contained in constitutions, statutes and treatises, p. 
569. 
29 Bredbrenner, Candice Lewis, A Nationality of Her Own: Women, Marriage and the Law of Citizenship, p. 4.  
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‘All subjects of the Empire are called Ottomans, without distinction, whatever faith they profess; 
the status of an Ottoman is acquired and lost, according to conditions specified by law’ (Art 8).  
 
The TOK was furthermore an effort to impede the applications of Ottoman subjects for foreign 
citizenship (thus indirectly weakening the Empire).30 The Ottomans traditionally ruled over their 
vast empire through mediating elites, but as western influence of different forms increased, so did 
the interest on behalf of the Ottomans to create a direct, tighter relationship with their subjects.31  
The Ottoman notion of citizenship (ra’wiyya) was based on geographical affiliation (jus soli) instead 
of ethnic or religious. Anyone who resided on Ottoman territory when the TOK was 
promulgated was considered an Ottoman citizen, provided that he followed one of the three 
monotheistic religions (Article 9 of the TOK).32 However, the TOK ensured that the Ottoman 
citizenship subsequently would be based on descent, jus sanguinis, law of blood (Article 21). 
 
Conc lus ion to Part  One 
World War I and the subsequent defeat and dismemberment of the Ottoman Empire put an end 
to the era of modernization and reforms that had been initiated during the previous century. Due 
to the rising economical and ideological foreign influence and its implicated threat to the 
Ottoman Empire, the Ottoman authorities had realized the need of maintaining a direct relation 
with Ottoman subjects and keeping their loyalty, thus introducing the westernized Citizenship 
Law of 1869, and the civil Family Law of 1917, also in an effort to undermine the power of the 
strong religious classes.  
 
The political events of World War I toppled the social order in the territories, and witnessed the 
rise of Arab nationalism and women’s activism. The British had since long supported the desire 
for self-determination in the territories, hoping for allies that could fight Ottoman Empire from 
within. The people of the territories were not united in their aspirations on state building, 
although the support for self-determination was strong. Some wanted a Muslim Arab Caliphate, 
some a secular republic, and still others wanted support from Western countries. In sum, this 
chaotic time was seen by many as an opportunity to re-negotiate social and cultural traditions as 
well as political realities - many women started to re-view woman’s position in society and claim 
equal rights for men and women. The famine crisis, the altered political and social order and the 
perils of the war, did also create a strong need to return to normalcy, however. Thompson has 
argued that this contributed to a crisis of paternity, and a need to re-build the social structure. 
Then came the establishment of the French Mandate, and the different political agendas of the 
different groups in the territories were stifled for some time.  
                                                
30 Davis, Uri, Citizenship and the State: A Comparative Study of Citizenship Legislation in Israel, Jordan, Palestine and Lebanon, 
p. xxvii.  
31 Thompson, Elizabeth, Colonial Citizens: Republican Rights, Paternal Privilege, and Gender in French Syria and Lebanon, p. 
77.  
32 Davis, Uri, Citizenship and the State: A Comparative Study of Citizenship Legislation in Israel, Jordan, Palestine and Lebanon, 
p. xxv. 
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Part Two: The French Mandate and Citizenship 
After the  war 
The Ottoman Empire was defeated in 1918, and the League of Nations placed Lebanon and 
Syria under French mandate. In 1920 the Sykes-Picot agreement (that secretly had been 
concluded in 1916) divided the Ottoman Empire into French and British areas of influence with 
the consent of Russia. Syria and Lebanon was under French control, and was treated as an un-
separated entity during most of the mandate. The Ottoman legal system was officially terminated 
in 1924.  
The French took position as mandate power in disrupted and traumatized society. World War I 
and the great famine of 1915-1918 had altered the old social order, creating a deep trauma within 
the population and a profound need to return to normalcy.33  
When the men left their families to fight in the war, the women had to replace them at 
workplaces and in families as heads of households. The interwar period thus witnessed dramatic 
changes in society and economy. After the war, work and employment plummeted, and the men 
fought to reinstall themselves in the workforce, now also occupied by women.34 According to 
Thompson, these dramatic changes helped to form a crisis of paternity in the Lebanese culture. 
The advent of French rule did not help to resolve this crisis of paternity or appease its symptoms, 
but rather made it worse.  
The Armed Res is tance   
The armed resistance against the French was centered in Syria, but spilled over into Lebanon on 
several occasions. The most important rebellion was the Syrian revolt, which started in the Druze 
mountains (Jabal Druze) of southern Syria. The Druze chief lead ten thousand men to capture al-
Suwaida, the provincial capital of the Hawran (al-Houran).35 The reason was the intrusive 
measures of the new Commander of the Druze mountains, General Gabriel Carbillet,36 who had 
little regard for tribal autonomy, which France otherwise respected to some degree for diplomatic 
reasons. Then, the Syrian nationalist leaders officially declared a revolution against France on 
August 23 1925.  
Establ ishment of  the  French Mandate  and the  High  Commiss i oners  
The French ruled indirectly through intermediaries in an almost feudal manner. The 
intermediaries were the local elites of tribal sheikhs, religious patriarchs and rural landowners who 
                                                
33 Thompson, Elizabeth, Colonial Citizens: Republican Rights, Paternal Privilege, and Gender in French Syria and Lebanon, p. 
30. 
34 Ibid. 35. 
35 Ibid. 43. 
36 Fieldhouse, D.K., Western Imperialism in the Middle East 1914 – 1958, p. 287. 
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were in favor of the French High Commissioner Henri Gouraud against the Syrian King Faysal 
in the 1920s and received privileges for their cooperation and loyalty.  
 
“[T]he French fostered a neofeudal landowning class in both Syria and Lebanon with economic 
and political power that far surpassed that of the Ottoman era. In exchange for political loyalty, 
the French awarded large tracts of Ottoman imperial land to tribal shaykhs, village chiefs, and 
landlords in the plains of Lebanon and the north and northeast of Syria.”37 
The political structure was based on republican rights and representation, but political power 
followed the lines of paternalistic privilege.38 What with the state of paternalistic crisis that the 
society experienced even prior to the French intervention, this worsened the gender-related 
conflict: 
“Because it so fundamentally defined power, gender became a primary site of conflict between the French 
and the Syrians and Lebanese as they variously challenged and defended these paternalistic privileges.”39  
The first High Commissioner, Henri Gouraud, based his authority on ties with religious 
patriarchs (for example the Maronite church in Lebanon) and other elites according the ancient 
principle of “divide and conquer”, in effect promoting a society where power and privilege ran 
along sectarian lines.40 However, a leftist government had been elected in France during the 
mandate of General Maxime Weygand (April 1923 – November 1924) and his successor, Maurice 
Serrail (November 1924 – December 1925). This implicated a new policy with “France’s colonial 
children” where “such a state would rule not through favors to mediating elites, but as Foreign 
Minister Aristide Briand put it, through respect for the Rights of Man”. 
Although Maxime Weygand and Maurice Serrail both used the language of republicanism, the 
French order was paternalistic and colonial. The French were the “tutors” of the Lebanese and 
the Syrians, who had no right to elect or dismiss them. Weygand sought to create alliances with 
the middle classes instead of the old elites, and removed the Maronite church from active 
decision-making in Lebanon.41 Serrail, his successor, was even more inclined to exclude religious 
patriarchs from political power, and sought to abolish the confessional quotas in Lebanese 
elections entirely. This was welcomed by Sunni Muslims, many of whom had been left out of the 
census in 1921, thus excluded from representation, and now saw a means to increase their 
political influence.  
 
Sarrails successor was the civilian Henri de Jouvenel (23 December 1925 – 23 June 1926). The 
Lebanese constitution was realized during de Jouvenels mandate. It was promulgated on May 23, 
1926, due to pressure from the League of Nations. The idea of non-sectarian politics was finally 
rejected, due to the high sectarian tension in Lebanon. De Jouvenel re-established the 
cooperation with the Maronite church, once again installing it as a pillar of French rule.  
                                                
37 Ibid. pp. 53-54.  
38 Ibid. p. 43.  
39 Ibid. pp. 3-4. 
40 Ibid. p. 44.  
41 Ibid. 45. 
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The Lebanese  Consti tu ti on 
The Lebanese Constitution was modeled after the constitution of the French Third Republic. 
The constitution provided for a parliamentary government with a French High Commissioner 
with power to dismiss the unicameral parliament (the Chamber of Deputies), annul laws, to 
suspend the constitution (which the French came to do numerous times before independence) 
and to retain control over the military, the police and foreign affairs.  
The constitution gave every Lebanese the right to hold office based on merit, but it also 
stipulated for equal representation of each sect in the cabinet, the parliament and in civil service. 
The constitution guaranteed respect for each religious sect. Accordingly, the president was to be a 
Maronite Christian, the prime minister a Sunni Muslim, and the speaker of parliament a Shia 
Muslim. Initially, the parliament was to perform a legislative function, but came to pass the bills 
prepared by the executive without exception, hence creating a very dominant executive.  
The early Lebanese political regime was influenced by both Ottoman and French political 
practice.42 The French directly, through the direct power of the High Commissioner, and 
indirectly, through the cultural and educational exchange between France and Lebanon – many 
Lebanese politicians had studied law in France. The Ottoman legacy appeared in the 
apportionment of parliamentary seats to each sect, a policy dating back to the first Ottoman 
elections in 1876. The constitution ensured universal male suffrage, where political power 
previously had required possession of property – but the two-staged elections ensured that elites 
would continue to keep the upper hand of the electoral process. Rules for secret balloting were 
violated on a routinely basis, as are they today. 
The constitution further states that the (patriarchal) family is the smallest unit of the Lebanese 
society,43 thus elevating patrilineality to a legal norm. This helped to solidify a set of patriarchal 
social practices that in the past appear to have been more flexible, when matrilineal kin was 
almost equally important, as Suad Joseph argues. Patrilineality is also sanctioned by religious 
norms and practices. All the 18 officially recognized sects apply patrilineal and patriarchal social 
practices. The centrality of patrilineality is furthermore endorsed by the centrality of kinship in 
Lebanese culture, which is one of few features uniting Lebanon’s ethnically, culturally and 
religiously diverse society.44  
The Nati onal i t y Law 
The Nationality Law was published in 1925 and regulated Lebanese citizenship. Article 1 of 
Order No. 15/S of January 19, 1925, states the following: 
 
Article 1. The following are Lebanese: 
He is considered Lebanese: 
(1) Individuals born of a Lebanese father. 
                                                
42 Thompson, Elizabeth, Colonial Citizens: Republican Rights, Paternal Privilege, and Gender in French Syria and Lebanon, p. 
30, and El-Gemayel, Antoine E., The Lebanese Legal System, pp. 18-19.  
43 Joseph, Suad, ‘Descent of the Nation: Kinship and Citizenship in Lebanon’, 3:3 Citizenship Studies (1999) p. 299. 
44 Ibid. 298.  
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(2) Individuals born in the territory of Greater Lebanon, who at their birth do not prove to have 
acquired a foreign nationality by filiation.  
(3) Individuals born in the territory of Greater Lebanon of unknown parents or whose nationality is 
unknown.  
 
The Nationality Law of 1925 confirmed patrilineal descent as a condition for Lebanese 
citizenship. Lebanese women originally lost their own nationality upon marriage with foreigners 
but could reclaim it once the husband had died or after a divorce – this was changed through a 
legal amendment in 1960. Foreign women who recently had acquired Lebanese citizenship, 
enjoyed the ability to confer Lebanese citizenship to their minor children, in case their Lebanese 
husband had died – while Lebanese women could not confer Lebanese citizenship to their 
children after the death of a foreign husband (Art 4)45. One of the few cases in which Lebanese 
women could confer their nationality to their children, was if their child was illegitimate, thus not 
enjoying the protection of a father and the patriarchal family inscribed in the constitution, 
inadvertently leading some women to untruthfully claim that their child was illegitimate, so as to 
give them their citizenship (Art 2)46.  
 
The Nationality Law of 1925 was inspired of French Citizenship Law of the time, but Lebanese 
authorities did not follow their example when French women received independent citizenship in 
1960.  
The supporters of dependent citizenship for Lebanese women often frame it as a measure to 
protect Lebanon from the political effects of immigration, which would risk tilting the sensitive 
confessional balance. The restrictive law of nationality mirrors the need on Lebanon’s behalf to 
protect itself from the political and religious tension inherent in the region, since Lebanon is 
considered a safe haven for immigrants.47 This was also the case with the American expatriation 
act from 1907, which denaturalized American women of their citizenship if they married 
foreigners48. Legislators feared that there would be a contradiction of loyalties for women married 
to foreigners. It was woman’s duty to be loyal to her husband – could she be loyal to her husband 
and her nation at the same time, if her husband was a foreigner? In Lebanon, the resistance 
against women’s independent citizenship correlates with the support for the religious Personal 
                                                
45 Article 4. A woman married to a foreigner who has become a naturalized Lebanese, and the children of age of 
naturalized foreigner will be able, if they apply therefor, to obtain the Lebanese nationality, without condition of 
residence, either by an ordinance which confers this nationality to the husband, father or mother, or by a special 
ordinance. The minor children of a father or a surviving mother, who have been naturalized as Lebanese will become 
Lebanese unless during the year which follows their majority they refuse this quality.  
46 Article 2. The natural [illegitimate, authors note] child whose filiation is established during his minority will take 
the Lebanese nationality if the one of his parents, in whose behalf the proof of filiation has been given, is, in first 
instance, a Lebanese. If this proof is given for both the father and mother by the same deed or judgment, the child 
will have the nationality of the father, if the latter is Lebanese.  
 
47 El-Gemayel, Antoine E., The Lebanese Legal System, p. 477. 
48 Bredbenner, Candice Lewis, A Nationality of Her Own, p. 4.  
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Status Codes. Both dependent citizenship and the Personal Status Codes define women’s rights 
from their positions in the patriarchal family.  
The Personal  S ta tus  Codes  
During the 1930s the struggle between the French and the religious patriarchs for legal authority 
heightened. This was due to the dual legal system, an old Ottoman institution that the French 
themselves had re-imposed on the Lebanese and Syrian populations. The dual legal system 
provided the religious patriarchs with authority over personal law, such as inheritance, marriage, 
child custody, etc, while the state regulated the rest. Respect for the religious sects and their 
personal status codes, is inscribed in the constitution (Article 9 of the Lebanese Constitution). 
This implicated that citizens of different creed and gender held different status. There were, 
however, many gray areas, in which the French and the religious patriarchs fought for 
jurisdiction.  
 
There are 15 different codes for the eighteen officially recognized sects49, to which the state has 
delegated jurisdiction over personal status, family law and to some extent succession. By doing 
that, the state elevated religious law to common law. The Sunni and Ja’fari (Shi’a) personal status 
codes were based on the secular Ottoman Family Law of 1917 and Hanafi and Ja’fari religious 
schools, and were introduced in 1942. The Druze personal status code was issued in 1948. The 
Christian and Jewish personal status codes were issued in 1951 during a secular government, but 
were never ratified due to demonstrations against them by lawyers and clergy – the first argued 
that the religious groups obtained to much control through the personal status codes, and the 
latter argued that it wasn’t extensive enough50.  
The personal status codes have effects on nationality, as in the case of children born out of 
wedlock. As previously mentioned, a person is considered Lebanese, if born to a Lebanese father. 
One case in which a woman can confer her nationality is if the child is illegitimate, why some 
Lebanese women have claimed that their legitimate children are born out of wedlock, in order to 
give them right to the Lebanese nationality. In that case Lebanese nationality thus depends on 
bedroom loyalty, which Uri Davis points out.51  
The women’ s  movements  
The end of the Ottoman Empire and the advent of French rule initiated the age of mass 
movements in the territories. Among them were the women’s movements. As I previously 
mentioned, there was a national re-assessment of self for Lebanese and Syrians in the political 
unrest that followed World War One, the dismemberment of the Ottoman Empire and the 
                                                
49 The religious sects confirmed by the state are: Maronite Christian, Greek-Catholic, Armenian-Catholic, Syriac-
Catholic, Roman-Catholic, Chaldean-Catholic, Greek-Orthodox, Armenian-Orthodox, Syriac-Monophysite, 
Assyrian, Protestant, Coptic-Orthodox, Chaldean-Orthodox, Sunni, Shiite, Druze, Alawite and Jewish.  
50 For more information about the differences and similarities between the Lebanese Personal Status Codes and their 
effect on women, please read Lamia Rustum Shehadeh’s article ‘The Legal Status of Married Women in Lebanon’, 
which will give an insightful overview.  
51 Davis, Uri, Citizenship and the State: A Comparative Study of Citizenship Legislation in Israel, Jordan, Palestine, Syria and 
Lebanon, p. 151. 
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French occupation, and as Thompson argues, a growing crisis of paternity. This ignited lively 
debates and political unrest for many years to come in the territories. In the republican and 
nationalist spirit that spread in the territories (inspired by Young Turks as well as the motto of 
the French revolution “Liberté, Égalité, Fraternité”), women started to claim social and political 
rights for themselves, as well as for their husbands and sons. Women demanded reform of the 
constitution, which provided for universal male suffrage only and didn’t prohibit discrimination 
based on gender. This was considered very controversial, and was opposed by religious elements, 
as well as by the French.  
Women participating in the debates and claiming their rights often had to suffer repercussions; 
there was violence at demonstrations, street hassling, and public condemnation and ridicule from 
religious sources. A good example was the case of Nazira Zayn al-Din and her important and 
radical book, ‘Un-veiling and Veiling’, which was published in 1928. In the book, Zayn al-Din 
questioned and challenged the practice of veiling from a religious Muslim point of view. 
Although the book initially was widely admired and appraised, Muslim religious sources were 
quick to denounce it, and the debates that followed turned into a public outcry. This had a very 
unfortunate impact on the general claims of the women’s organizations and their paths to female 
liberation, as all such claims suddenly became radical.  
In order not to isolate them selves from the society, women’s organizations made an ideological 
move to the political center. Their rhetoric changed; from having demanded the right to vote and 
argued for the benefits of un-veiling, women now claimed they would have to make themselves 
worthy of citizenship by improving themselves, for example through education,52 and justified 
women’s right to citizenship with their roles as mothers – mothers of citizens, mothers of the 
nation. By using this kind of rhetoric, the women’s movement sought support from the 
nationalist opposition. They had understood that they needed allies in order to not become 
isolated, and some feminists were convinced that independence had to come before the liberation 
of the Lebanese women. 
The women’s conferences between 1928 and 1930 had almost exclusively a social agenda, 
omitting most of the political claims from the past. Partly, this was due to the fact that many of 
the women who were engaged in women’s organizations also were working with charity 
organizations, often supported by religious funds.53 They hadn’t given up all claims on political 
rights and citizenship though. Their hope lay with the nationalist opposition. They hoped that the 
secular and reform-minded nationalists would win the struggle against France, and that they, 
when Lebanon was independent, would grant women their rights.54 But women gained no 
support for their initiatives to reform, when it stood clear that the nationalists depended on the 
religious patriarchs. In order to achieve independence the nationalists and the religious had to put 
aside their differences and work together. The losers in this compromise were the women’s 
                                                
52 Thompson, Elizabeth, Colonial Citizens: Republican Rights, Paternal Privilege, and Gender in French Syria and Lebanon, p. 
30, and El-Gemayel, Antoine E., The Lebanese Legal System, p. 144. 
53 Ibid. 145. 
54 Ibid. 146. 
  
 
 
18 
groups. Although the nationalists didn’t approve of the dual legal system, they downplayed 
women’s demands for a compromise with the religious patriarchs.55 
World War Two 
World War Two came with a fresh fear of famine, but this time the Lebanese were prepared. The 
political effects of the war were massive in the territories. The Third Republic of France had been 
defeated by Germany, and was succeeded by the rightwing Vichy government, which 
collaborated with the Germans. In Syria and Lebanon, soldiers loyal to the Vichy government 
and Germany fought against Charles de Gaulle’s Free French forces and the British. In 1941, the 
Free French recaptured Syria and Lebanon in conjunction with the Allies and their Syria-Lebanon 
campaign, ‘Operation Exporter’, and the Governor General of the Free French forces, Georges 
Catroux, was made High Commissioner (24 June 1941 – 7 June 1943) of the mandate. It was 
clear, however, that France’s position in the territories had changed forever. The Free French had 
little financial means to support the people of the territories, who now marched the streets, 
protesting against the increasing bread prizes and calling for higher minimum wages.56 
 
In 1941, Catroux, who was more liberal than his predecessors, proclaimed a conditional 
independence for Lebanon. The Nationalist opposition took office and realized their 
conservative social agenda. The election in 1943 came to be in favor of or against the French.57 
Jean Helleu (7 June 1943 – 23 November 1943) was appointed Delegate General and had a 
political agenda for Lebanon different from that of Catroux. Helleu aimed to strengthen the 
French hold over the territories. In November 1943, the Lebanese Parliament ratified the 
Constitution, omitting the articles that gave authority to the French mandate, while Senegalese 
and French soldiers surrounded the Assembly Hall.58 
Conc lus ion to Part  Two 
The French reinforced a patriarchal social order in Lebanon, by contributing to and supporting 
legislation that consolidated women’s position in society, and using intermediary elites to base 
their rule. Although the Ottomans also had used a system of mediating elites, they had started 
modernizing reforms, beginning in the middle of the 19th Century until the end of the Ottoman 
Empire, in an effort to strengthen the loyalty of the citizens to the state and to diminish the 
influence of religious patriarchs and tribal shaykhs. The French effectively contradicted these 
measures, and built their rule using intermediate agents from tribal, religious or economic elites, 
rewarding them with power over other citizens, including “peasants, workers, family members 
and members of religious communities of both sexes, as well as women of every status.”59, and 
re-installed men as the formal heads of households, representing and protecting women and 
children.  
                                                
55 Ibid. 148. 
56 Ibid. 233.  
57 Ibid. 250. 
58 Ibid. 253.  
59 Ibid. 3.  
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By delegating the legislative authority over family law to the religious leaders, the French not only 
consolidated the political and social power of the religious, but also let them define the social and 
political status of women according to their different beliefs. Furthermore, the Constitution from 
1926, and the Nationality Law from 1925, established patrilineality and women received 
dependent citizenship.  
 
As Thompson noted, the age of the mass movement had come to the territories after the defeat 
of the Ottoman Empire. Women continued to work actively to realize their rights, as did the 
nationalists and religious leaders. The question of women’s position in society had, however, also 
become an important question for religious groups, who argued that women did not have a place 
in the public sphere whatsoever. Women had sought support from the nationalists by changing 
their rhetoric; instead of claiming civil and political rights directly, they argued their value as 
‘Mothers of the Nation’ and that they would make themselves worthy of civil and citizenship 
rights eventually, through education. This resembles the problematic argument of ‘republican 
motherhood’ of American suffragettes once claimed to justify women’s citizenship, thus 
implicating that their only value as citizens was through the sons they might give birth to, while 
women themselves were ‘disposable citizens’.60  
 
Women’s groups had to balance their claims between religious groups, nationalists, the French 
authorities and the rest of society, and were eventually downplayed by all. The French had never 
shown any support for the activities and claims of the women’s groups, and later came to refuse 
the nationalists’ demands on independence in the strongest possible way.  
                                                
60 Bredbenner, Candice Lewis, A Nationality of Her Own: Women, Marriage and the Law of Citizenship, p. 12. 
  
 
 
20 
Part Three: The Lebanese independence and 
beyond 
Histor ical  Summary 
In September 1943 Beshara el-Khoury (Maronite Christian) was elected President of the republic 
and Riad as-Solh (Sunni Muslim) was appointed prime minister. On November 8 1943, the 
Chamber of Deputies amended the Lebanese constitution, omitting the articles referring to the 
French Mandate and the power of the High Commissioner. The French reacted by arresting the 
president and the prime minister in their homes in the middle of the night and exiled them to the 
castle of Rashaya, near the city of Sidon. The action provoked massive protests in Lebanon as 
well as internationally, and France yielded and released the prisoners on November 22 1943, 
which since then has been celebrated as the Lebanese Independence day. President el-Khoury 
and the Prime minister as-Solh, then formed the National Pact (al-Mithaq al-Watani), an 
unwritten agreement between the Christian and Muslim groups in Lebanon.61  
The agreement contained four major principles, stating that Lebanon was an independent state 
that shouldn’t bend to the will of European powers nor seek to merge with Arab states, that it 
shouldn’t sever the culturally and spiritually important ties to Europe, and was to cooperate with 
the other Arab states but remain neutral incase a conflict arouse; and that its public offices should 
be distributed according the ratio of recognized religious sects which was 6 Christians to 5 
Muslims based on the politically important census of 193262, and that the three top government 
positions should be distributed among the confessional sects as follows; The President post was 
to be occupied by a Maronite Christian, the Prime minister a Sunni Muslim and the speaker of 
parliament a Shiite Muslim. This ensured that the Maronites had the ultimate executive authority.  
In 1945, Lebanon became a member of the Arab League and the United Nations. In December 
1946, France withdrew the French forces after signing the Franco-Lebanese Treaty.  
                                                
61 Collelo, Thomas (ed.), Lebanon: A Country Study, [http://countrystudies.us/lebanon/], [16/06/2009] 
62 The National Pact of 1945 that decided the ratio of the different sects in political institutions, relied heavily on the 
censuses of 1921 and 1932. However, as Rania Maktabi notes, both censuses failed to include large groups of the 
populations, predominantly in Muslim areas, and many who were born after the census of 1932 were not enrolled in 
the personal registries due to the low support and “administrative short-comings” of local religious leaders. Maktabi 
argues that this, at least partly, was an intended outcome on behalf of the Maronites and the French in order to 
maintain the political power in Christian hands. The fact that the Maronites wanted to include the numerous and 
mainly Christian emigrants in their ratio as the basis for power sharing, and that acquiring Lebanese citizenship 
required very strong evidence of residence in the territory on August 30, 1924, notoriously difficult for Muslim 
nomads to get hold of, suggests that the French authorities and the Maronites wanted to give the bulk of the political 
authority to the Christians. In practice, this required registration in the census of 1921, which had been boycotted by 
many Muslims since they didn’t want to legitimize Lebanon’s parting from Syria. 
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Post- independence  Pol i t i c s   
The politics after independence centered around patron-client relationships and prominent family 
networks, with each sectarian community having its own important family. This new elite was 
known as zu’ama, (singular: zaim) the patron in a modern type of clientalism. Clientalism, 
described by Hamzeh, as a set of interpersonal relations based on unequal exchange between 
patrons and clients, is a deep-rooted system in Lebanon and the Middle East, and dates back to 
the Ottoman system of feudal landlords and peasants of the 18th Century. In the past it was based 
on personal allegiance, but during the 19th and 20th Century it came to revolve around sectarian 
affiliation and later around party politics. The system of zu’ama was a product of the 
establishment of the modern Lebanese state, argues Hamzeh. The zaim strives for access to state 
resources, in order to provide clients with services, capital and employment. The position of a 
Zaim is often hereditary.  
The politics of President el-Khoury soon became known as imperial and sectarian biased, and el-
Khoury resigned after a mass rally in Deir al-Qamar in 1952, known as the ‘rose water 
revolution’. The Chamber of Deputies elected Camille Chamoun for successor. During 
Chamoun’s mandate (1952-1958), the criticism of the Christian influence on Lebanese politics 
increased from the Muslim community. The Suez crisis and the merging of Egypt and Syria into 
the United Arab Republic increased the tension and the ideological gap between Muslims and 
Christians in Lebanon. Chamoun’s successor, Fuad Shihab, initiated an electoral reform, which 
strengthened the executive at the expense of the zu’ama, a policy that became known as 
Shihabism. In 1964 when Charles Helou became president, the Arab-Israeli war parted the country 
politically and ideologically. The conflict was definitely brought to Lebanese turf when Palestinian 
gerilla groups started fighting from Southern Lebanon, followed by the subsequent Israeli attack 
on December 28 1968. The crisis, with clashes between the Lebanese Army and Palestinian 
gerilla groups, lasted until the October War of 1973.  
The Civ i l  War 
The civil war began in 1975 and lasted until 1990, and was ended by the adoption of the Taif-
agreement. Discussing the war and its regional and internal reasons is far beyond the scope of 
this paper, and since it is a very complicated matter, I shall not attempt to do so. However, the 
conflict arising from the confessional imbalance consolidated through the National Pact is widely 
regarded as one of its reasons. 
 
The Taif -ag reement 
The Taif-agreement (the Document of National Accord) was a compromise between the 
Lebanese political groups, parties, leaders and militias, and intended to bring an end to the Civil 
War and provide a solution to the regional and internal problems causing the war. The agreement 
contained the reinforcement of the following principles; the Arab identity of Lebanon; as was 
Lebanon’s independence and sovereignty; Lebanon’s unity; Lebanon’s political system was a 
parliamentary democracy; its socio-economic system a free economy; and that ending political 
sectarianism was a basic national goal. The question of Lebanon’s sovereignty was not solved due 
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to the regional aspects of the war.  
The agreement introduced 31 constitutional amendments, approved by the parliament and the 
President, Elias el-Hrawi on 21 September 1990. The amendments largely strengthened the 
power of the Parliament, the Council of Ministers and the Prime Minister (traditionally Sunni 
Muslim) versus the President. The term of the Speaker of Parliament (traditionally Shiite Muslim) 
was prolonged to four years of service, and the terms under which the President could dissolve 
the Parliament was limited to three rare cases.  
However, many argue that the Taif-agreement, despite calling for an end to political sectarianism 
as a goal for the future, actually ratified and reinforced the political sectarianism and confessional 
discrimination of the National Pact.  
 
Changes  in  Citizenship 
In 1960 women who married foreigners were given the option to choose to either retain their 
nationality, or to assume the nationality of their husband, whereas they before had lost their 
nationality automatically63. However, the foreign husband cannot take the Lebanese nationality 
through his wife whereas a foreign wife to a Lebanese husband takes the Lebanese nationality 
automatically and may retain it even after the death of the husband. President Camille Chamoun 
granted women full suffrage and right to hold office in the 1953 electoral law.64 
Since the fifties, activists have worked for civil marriage and establishment of a civil personal 
status code. A bill on an optional status law was drafted by representatives for the Democratic 
Party in the seventies and presented for the parliament, but was never under debate. Kamal 
Joumblatt, leader of the National Movement also proposed an optional personal status law in 
1975, following their secularist ideology, and the Syrian National Party did the same in 1997. In 
1998 President Elias Hrawi headed a group of jurist to prepare a bill for the cabinet, where it 
stalled.  
Lebanese women’s groups and human rights organizations have continued to push for changes 
of the Lebanese citizenship laws, the personal status codes and to advocate for the possibility of 
civil marriage in Lebanon. Several times human rights groups have launched campaigns for 
changes in the citizenship law, and in 1993 the state responded by putting together a ministerial 
committee to study the Lebanese Nationality Law. A draft law was endorsed in 1995, to let 
Lebanese widows of foreign husbands grant their nationality to their children with a suggested 
addition made by the Minister of Justice that the woman would have to prove her continuous 
                                                
63 Translated from Arabic: Supplement to Sader Law of January 11, 1960  
Article 4: For a Lebanese woman who has lost her nationality through marriage to a foreigner before 
the publication of this law, it is possible to regain that nationality by request.  
64 Thompson, Elizabeth, Colonial Citizens: Republican Rights, Paternal Privilege, and Gender in French Syria and Lebanon, p. 
260. 
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residence in Lebanon for at least five years. Women’ and human rights activists objected, and a 
parliamentary subcommittee was to formed to study the subject, which it still does.65  
Mary Rose Zalzal, working with the Movement for Secularism, stated in an interview that 
“Religious and political leaders share a common interest in preventing any movement towards 
secularism” and that they were “very strong financially and socially”. She further notes the 
importance of women’s groups in bringing about change and that local change is faster than 
national change.66  
As recent as February 11, 2009, Lebanon’s Minister of Interior Ziad Baroud, announced that 
Lebanese citizens would have the right to remove their religion from their identification papers 
and in the Civil Registry Records, which can be seen as a cautious step closer to civil personal 
status laws – although the religious personal status laws still apply for everyone.67  
In 1996, the government approved CEDAW in law 57268, but made a reservation to the second 
paragraph of Article 9 – as many other Arab countries has. 
Conc lus ion to Part  Three  
As Mary Rose Zalzal states, there are groups with a vested interest against any changes in laws 
concerning citizenship, personal status and civil marriage in Lebanon. The confessional system of 
Lebanese politics has ensured that religious groups have kept their positions in the government, 
even considering the radical changes that Lebanon’s political landscape has undergone since the 
civil war. The democratic system is young in Lebanon, while clientalism and kinship have an 
ancient history the Middle East. Clientalism and kinship permeate the social structure and 
political institutions and follow confessional lines. Religious groups still enjoy a great political and 
social influence in Lebanon, and the personal status codes constitute an important part in this. It 
is important to note that not all religious groups are against changes in personal status laws, civil 
marriage and independent citizenship for women - in fact, many organizations working for 
women’s citizenship rights, are religious. 
                                                
65 SHS Papers in Women’s Studies/Gender Research No. 4, Women in Personal Status Laws: Iraq, Jorsan, Lebanon, 
Palestine, Syria, Gihane Tabet, p. 21.  
66 Zalzal, Marie Rose, ‘Secularism and Personal Status Codes in Lebanon: Interview with Marie Rose Zalzal, Esquire’, 
No. 203 Lebanon and Syria: The Geopolitics of Change Middle East Report (1997) p.  
67 Human Rights Watch, Lebanon: Removal of Religion from IDs Positive but not Sufficient, Human Rights Watch 
News February 16, 2009.   
68 (Translated from Arabic)  
Article 1, law 572 (01 Aug 1996): 
The government approves the accession of Lebanon to the Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of 
Discrimination Against Women sanctioned by the General Assembly of the United Nations 18 December 1979, 
and attached to this law are the reservations to some of the obligations of Lebanon: 
In the 2nd paragraph to article 9 referring to granting women equal rights to those of men concerning the 
nationality of their children.  
In the sections j, d, w and z from the 1st paragraph to Article 16 with regard to:  
Article “j” referring to equal rights in marriage.  
Article “d” referring to the mother’s rights in issues concerning her children. 
Article “w” referring to the guardianship and custody of the children and their adoption.   
Article “z” in the part referring to the name of the family. 
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Civil society has been active in negotiating women’s citizenship, as well as pushing for civil 
personal status law and civil marriage, but their claims have usually been stopped or stalled in the 
parliament or the cabinet, when not being interrupted by war and conflict. The resistance against 
women’s dependent citizenship correlates with the support for the religious Personal Status 
Codes. 
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Analysis 
Objec t ives  of  in troduc ing  and maintain ing  dependent c i t izenship and the  
PSCs69 
Dependent citizenship was a common policy also among western countries when it was 
introduced in the territories, although women’s movements criticized it widely. However, it was 
introduced during the French mandate, as was the Personal Status Codes, although neither of the 
policies was new to the territories. The Ottoman authorities had introduced the western notion 
of citizenship through the Citizenship Law of 1869 (the TOK), including dependent citizenship 
for women, and the different religious creeds had traditionally handled family law in religious 
courts. The TOK was an effort to modernize the Empire and to confirm its authority over the 
Ottoman subjects, in view of the increasing Western influence. After the defeat of the Ottoman 
Empire there was chaos, conflict and turmoil in the territories, but there was also a great urge for 
self-determination after many years of Turkish hegemony, embodied in the many social 
movements that strived for different goals. After the establishment of the French Mandate, 
Lebanese and Syrians became subjects once again, although Thompson calls their rule ‘a colonial 
civic order’, that entailed compromises and negotiations between French and Lebanese. 
Nevertheless, the mandate was hierarchical and patriarchal, since they completely excluded 
women in the establishment of the Lebanese state.  
The French needed to consolidate their rule, and did so by using intermediate elites rather than 
seeking a wide social base. These were often landowners and tribal sheikhs, both positions 
associated with authority and with a long history in the Ottoman Empire. The legislation follows 
the same pattern with the Personal Status Codes – by giving the religious groups the jurisdiction 
over family law, they used well-known institutions from before WWI and avoided a conflict.  
 
The religious groups became, at least partly thanks to the French, an important political and 
social force for many years to come. They have both religious and political reasons to protect the 
jurisdiction as it is. In Lebanon power and authority runs along the lines of kinship and 
clientalism, which mostly follows confessional affiliation. In turn, kinships with strong religious 
identity, are almost exclusively of a patriarchal structure, why they also would be likely to support 
the ‘protective’ patriarchal status quo. For example, when I explained my study to one of my 
Lebanese friends – who happen to be a young, educated, Christian – he answered ‘Why does it 
matter that a woman cannot confer her nationality/citizenship to her children on her own, when 
she and the children will take the nationality of her husband?’ 
The jus t i f i cat ion of  the  pol i c y of  dependent  c i t izenship in  the  Lebanese  c ase  
As I have showed, the delegation of family law and personal status to the religious leaders and 
not providing a civil alternative, have strengthened the religious elites and consolidated their 
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influence over Lebanese politics and society. In turn, the personal status codes and the 
citizenship laws have consolidated women’s status as second class’ citizens, in terms of rights. 
The Personal Status Codes, the constitution and the Nationality Law creates and implements a 
blueprint over a patriarchal society where the patriarchal family is the nucleus of the society and 
the father keeps most of the authority. Institutions with a patriarchal structure, such as religious 
institutions, or kin, would naturally want to protect such legislation, although I must caution 
against generalizing in this matter.  
Another reason often given to defend the current citizenship legislation is the political situation 
in Lebanon and in the region. Although Lebanon has suffered its fair share from violence and 
difficult conflicts, it is regarded as a safe (and a comparatively liberal) haven for refugees and 
immigrants from neighboring countries. Thus, the restrictive citizenship legislation in conjunction 
with the equally restrictive migration laws, constitute a protection against the political dangers of 
immigration, i.e. male immigrants cannot become easily naturalized by marrying a Lebanese 
woman. Foreign women, however, automatically become naturalized if they marry a Lebanese 
man. This reasoning discloses yet another patriarchal concept – that women married to foreign 
men cannot be loyal to their husband and to the Lebanese nation at the same time since one 
cannot count on the foreign husband to feel loyal to Lebanon.  
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